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Tapovatz: The Putative Father's Rights after Roe v. Wade.

THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S RIGHTS AFTER
ROE v. WADE
WILLIAM E. TAPOVATZ
He who decides a case without hearing the other side, though he
decide justly, cannot be considered just.
Lucius A nnaeus Seneca
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade1 held
the Texas criminal abortion statutes 2 unconstitutional as violative of a
woman's fundamental personal right to decide whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. The Court found that the right to privacy guaranteed under
the penumbra of the due process clause of the 14th amendment is broad
enough to include the woman's decision to abort.3 In deciding Wade
the Court failed, however, to consider any rights which the putative 4 or legal
father may assert in opposition to the mother's decision to abort. 5 The
woman's right to decide the abortion question is undoubtedly unilateral in
that situation where only her personal rights are at issue. If the father, however, in an attempt to enjoin the abortion, contests the mother's decision and
asserts his paternal interest in the fetus, the woman's right may become
somewhat less than absolute.
EVOLUTION OF THE WOMAN'S RIGHT TO AN ABORTION

The series of decisions which culminated with Wade began in 1965 with
Griswold v. Connecticut.6 A state statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was held to be an unconstitutional invasion of a married person's right
to privacy. 7 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court stated:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea
is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. 8
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 33, at 55.
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). But see Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 932 (1973), wherein the au-

thor argues that no correlation exists between the right to privacy and the right to have
an abortion.
4. A putative father is the alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child.
State v. Nestaval, 75 N.W. 725 (Minn. 1898).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 n.67 (1973).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7.

Id. at 481-86.

8. Id.at 485-86.
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In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court held that the Griswold right
to privacy was not limited solely to married persons and that unmarried persons as well could not constitutionally be denied the use of contraceptives. 9
The Court was of the opinion that no such governmental interference was
authorized in matters which so fundamentally affect the person as the decision to bear or beget a child. 10
In 1970 it was decided that a Wisconsin criminal abortion statute unconstitutionally invaded a woman's private right to refuse to carry an unquickened" embryo.12 This decision presaged Young Women's Christian Association v. Kuglerl1 which appears to have been the direct forerunner of
the Wade decision. The Kugler case held that a woman has a constitutional
right under the 14th amendment to determine for herself whether to bear
a child or to terminate a pregnancy in its early stages free from unreasonable interference by the state. 14 Since the woman's right of choice in
the matter of abortion has been determined to be fundamental, any state
intrusion into this area must be founded upon a compelling state interest. 15
It is insufficient for the state to demonstrate that such a restrictive regulatory
scheme is motivated merely by some rational relationship to a valid state
interest.' 6
. The Court in Wade reaffirmed the woman's right to decide to terminate
pregnancy as a fundamental derivative of the right to privacy and held that
the Texas abortion statutes were an unconstitutional state infringement upon
this right. Wade, however, qualified the woman's right in an attempt to
balance her interest in privacy with the interest of the state in the fetus.
During the first trimester of pregnancy the state has no compelling interest
in the prospective life of the fetus that would justify statutory interference
with the abortion decision of the woman and her physician.' 7 Within the
first 3 months of pregnancy, therefore, the state may not regulate or proDuring the second trimester the
hibit the woman's decision to abort.'
9. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
10. Id. at 453.
11. A "quick child is one that has developed so that it moves within the mother's
womb." State v. Timm, 12 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Wis. 1944). Quickening usually occurs
at about the middle of the term of pregnancy. State v. Patterson, 181 P. 609, 610
(Kan. 1919).
12. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 299 (E.D. Wis. 1970). The Wisconsin
statute made it a criminal offense to perform an abortion except when necessary to
save the life of the mother. The Babbitz decision, however, has been criticized for
confusing the right to prevent conception with the right to terminate life. See Note,
The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 349, 372 (1971).
13. 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972).
14. Id.at 1072.
15. /d.at 1072.
16. Id. at 1072.
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
18. Id. at 164.
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state's interest in the fetus is not yet compelling, but the state may regulate
the abortion procedure in order to protect maternal health.1 9 The state
may not, during this stage of gestation, prohibit an abortion. 20 When the
fetus becomes viable, 21 however, the state's interest in protecting the life
of the unborn child becomes compelling. At this point the state's interest
becomes superior to the mother's right of privacy, and abortion may be
statutorily prohibited, except when necessary to protect maternal life or
22
health.
The Wade decision further qualifies the woman's right of privacy in that
the decision to terminate pregnancy is not to be hers alone. During the
first trimester, the abortion decision, upon request by the woman, is left to
the medical judgment of her attending physician. 23 It appears that while
the woman has the fundamental right to decide whether or not to terminate
pregnancy, she has no right to have an abortion on demand.2 4 So perhaps
the woman has no "right to an abortion" against a doctor's refusal to perform
25
one, but only a right to "request" an abortion.
When considering the father's right to participate in the abortion decision,
one must not lose sight of the various interests contrasted in Wade. In delineating the woman's right to terminate pregnancy, the Court was faced with
the problem of reconciling her right to privacy with the state's recognized interest in the unborn child. The unborn child's interests as a "person" were
not determined; in fact, the question as to when life begins for constitutional
purposes was explicitly avoided. 26 There seems to be no doubt that the
Court felt that at some time during the gestational period the interest of
the state in the child would become superior to the mother's right of privacy.
19. Id. at 164.
20. See id. at 164.
21. An unborn child reaches the stage of viability at the point during the gestational period at which it becomes capable of living outside the womb of the mother.
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1955). "A fetus generally becomes a
viable child between the sixth and seventh month of its existence." Id. at 905.
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
23. Id. at 164.
24. See Cane, Whose Right to Life? Implications of Roe v. Wade, 7 FAMILY L.Q.
413, 430 (1973).
25. Id. at 430. The author not only sees the implications of Wade as severely limited, but also questions the validity of the decision on factual grounds. The State of
Connecticut joined by 14 other states as amici curiae have lodged an appeal for
review of the decision under authority of Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) which
requires the Supreme Court to make an independent examination of the evidence in
the record when constitutional rights turn on the resolution of a factual dispute. Cane,
Whose Right to Life? Implications of Roe v. Wade, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 413 (1973). But
see Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1059
(1973). The author fears that the decision in Wade is a practical license for elective
abortion at any stage of pregnancy right up to the last minute before normal delivery,
Id. at 1062.
26. Roe v.Wade,410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
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The Court set that time to correspond with the stage of legal viability.27
When the Supreme Court declared that women have a personal, fundamental right to an abortion, it immediately qualified that right in consideration of the interests of that ubiquitous second party, the state. 28 It would
seem only just that the rights of a ubiquitous third party, the potential father,
when asserted, should also be given due consideration. 29 When it is considered that the woman's conditional right to an abortion was determined in
a situation in which no contradictory paternal rights were asserted, it appears
as though the right is far from indefeasible. Contestation by the father may
further qualify the mother's personal right to decide, simply because where
the "father's interest is involved, the abortion decision is no longer a private
0
matter."
In arriving at a woman's constitutional right to terminate pregnancy, the
Court was greatly concerned with the social and economic effects that an
unwanted child has upon the mother, both during the period of gestation
and during her post-delivery life.8 ' When the father opposes the abortion
decision, it is obvious that he wants the child and would either seek its custody or contribute to its support after birth. Consequently, the adverse effects of bearing an unwanted child would be substantially diminished in such
a situation. Certainly, once the financial burden and the personal inconvenience of raising the child are eliminated, the extent to which the mother's
privacy is invaded is considerably lessened. When the intrusion into the
mother's privacy can be minimized in this manner, the interests of the father
in his unborn child certainly deserve some consideration.3 2
RIGHTS OF THE PUTATIVE FATHER

In a recent Florida case, Jones v. Smith,8 3 a potential putative father who
27. Id. at 163. This determination appears somewhat arbitrary upon consideration
of the fact that for many purposes the viability distinction is considered obsolescent.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 56, at 337-38 (4th ed. 1971);

Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.

L. REV. 233, 241, 247 (1969); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and
Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 358 (1971).
28. Roev.Wade,410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).

29. The interests of the father in the unborn child are no less potential, no more
speculative than those of the state. This fact alone should substantiate a judicial hearing in consideration of the father's asserted rights in his unborn child. The fact, however, that no state interest in the fetus arises until the stage of viability is reached is
no indication that the father's rights in the fetus do not arise at an earlier time, perhaps even at the time of conception.
30. Note, Abortion: The Father'sRights, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 441, 460 (1973).
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
32. To some analysts, however, it appears rather doubtful that a court would "allow

the father to force the mother to carry the fetus to term."

Note, Abortion: The Fa-

ther's Rights, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 461 (1973).
33. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S.

Mar. 4, 1974).
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had acknowledged his paternal responsibility sought to enjoin the mother
from obtaining an abortion. The petitioner was able to show only that he
had dated the woman for a period of approximately 6 months and that
they had frequently had intimate relations. She refused his offer of marriage and sought an abortion. The Florida Court of Appeals denied the
injunction on the basis of the Wade decision, holding that during the first
trimester of pregnancy the decision to abort is solely that of the woman and
her physician. 3 4 The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.3 5 From the decision in Jones it appears that the recognition of any
right of the putative potential father to participate in the decision to abort
will depend upon the establishment of some relational interest between the
father and the fetus.3 6 If the father is able to establish some cognizable
family relationship among himself, the mother and the unborn child, his interest in that child may be substantial enough to provide him with a voice
in the abortion decision. To determine the existence of such an interest,
one may look to some recent decisions in the fields of tort and family law.
The Adoption Analogy
A helpful analogy can be drawn between the putative father's consensual
privilege in adoption of the illegitimate child and any consensual privilege
that he might assert in the abortion decision. The adoption process is one
in which the legal rights and obligations which exist between the child and
his natural parents are terminated. 37 The analogy is relevant because in
both the abortion and adoption situations the mother seeks to terminate the
parental interests in both herself and the father.
Generally, the parents of a legitimate child have equal relational interests
in their child.3 8 These interests are normally considered to be rights to the
39
services of the child and to the society, custody and control of the child.
Either parent is entitled to receive notice that the other has placed the child
for adoption. 40 Even though the natural parents may be divorced, the noncustodial parent is entitled to notice, inasmuch as his consent is essential to
the adoption. 41 Under these circumstances it is impossible for one parent
34. Id. at 344.
35. Jones v. Smith, 42 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1974).
36. For excellent discussions of relational interests generally, see Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rav. 460, 462-63 (1934); Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REv. 177, 181 (1916).
37. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrED

STATES

§ 18.1,

at 602 (1968).
38. Id. § 17.4, at 584-85.
39. Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 479 (1934); Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REv. 177, 181 (1916).
40. In re Adoption of a Minor, 160 F.2d 928, 930-31 (D.C. Cir. 1947); H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 18.2, at 612 (1968).

41. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
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to place a legitimate child for adoption without the consent of the other parent.
The rights of the putative father in the post partum child differ substantially from those of both the legitimate father and the illegitimate mother.

Though a putative father has a duty to support his illegitimate child, 42 his
rights in the child are secondary and subordinate to those of the mother. 4
The putative father suffers disabilities ,in his relationship with the child in
that he must gain consent of the mother to legitimate the child; visitation

privileges may be disallowed if the mother opposes them; the father's custodial privileges are secondary to those of the mother, and the mother may
put the child up for adoption without the consent of the father. 44 These
paternal disabilities are generally predicated upon the presumption, reflected
in most modern adoption statutes, that the mother is best suited to care for

children of tender years. 45 Under the principles of equal protection, however, the constitutionality of these statutory preferences is in serious doubt.
The recent plurality decision of Frontiero v. Richardson4 held that classifi-

cations based on sex, like those based on race, alienage or national origin,
are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 47 No
out notice to the child's father "violated the most rudimentary demands of due process
of law" and was therefore void. Id. at 550; accord, H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 18.2, at 612-13 (1968); Wadlington, The Divorced
Parent and Consent for Adoption, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 196 (1967). See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 224 (West 1954); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §§ 2-4 (Supp. 1972). Under some statutes, in certain instances, however, the consent of a divorced father
is not necessary to adoption of the child. See generally Wadlington, The Divorced Parent and Consent for Adoption, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 196 (1967).
42. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
43. Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 455 (1973).
See, e.g., Kilgore v. Tiller, 22 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. 1942).
44. Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 455 n.83 (1973).
45. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). That court stated:
Until recently, however, there has been a pattern of at least cursory invocation
by the courts in New York and elsewhere, of the presumption that children of tender years, all other things being equal, should be given into the custody of their
mother.
Id. at 287; accord, H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 17.4, at 585 (1968); Remarks of Harry M. Fain, Proceedings, A.B.A. SECTION OF
FAMILY LAW 27-9 (Aug. 13, 1963). See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153, 155
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
46. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
47. Justices Douglas, White and Marshall concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion.
Mr. Justice Powell, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred,
felt that the statutes in issue did unconstitutionally discriminate against service women,
however, disagreed with the conclusion that all classifications based on sex were inherently suspect. Id. at 691. In light of congressional approval of the Equal Rights
Amendment, Justice Powell felt that the Court was preempting a legislative function
through judicial action. Id. at 692. See also Kahn v. Shevin, 42 U.S.L.W. 4591 (U.S.
Apr. 24, 1974), holding that a state tax law reasonably designed to rectify the effects
of past discrimination against women did not arbitrarily discriminate against men. Id.
at 4593. The Fronticro case was distinguished in that the statutes considered therein
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statute may provide "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated. '48 Based' on the principles enunciated in Frontiero, the
Georgia Superior Court in Murphy v. Murphy49 found that alimony statutes
which provide for an allowance out of only the husband's estate for support
of the wife violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment
when no such provision is likewise made for the support of the husband. 50
Likewise, in at least one instance the "tender years presumption" in favor
of mothers has been held to violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In a recent decision 5" the New York Family Court, citing Frontiero,52 held that "the 'tender years presumption' in addition to its other
faults, works an unconstitutional discrimination" against the father in a custody proceeding.53 On the basis of these decisions it appears that any statute placing custody of the child in the mother, on the presumption that because of her sex she can better perform the function of a custodian, will
54
be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment5 5 could eliminate any
legal presumption favoring mothers over wed or unwed fathers because the
statutory differentiations are not based on characteristics unique to one sex.
Good parents may be found among either sex and any statutory presumption
favoring women in child custody would probably be violative of the amendment. Consequently, a putative father could have an equal voice in the
adoption proceeding and would be able to gain custody upon showing that
he is the best available guardian.
Under existing law, however, only the mother's consent is required to authorize the adoption of an illegitimate child. 6 An oft-cited rationale for this
were "not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against
women." Id. at 4592 n.8.
48. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
49. 42 U.S.L.W. 2393 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1974).
50. Id.

51. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973).
52. Id. at 290.

The court states:

Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States make clear that differential treatment on the basis of sex of the kind created by the 'tender years

presumption' is 'suspect' and therefore subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.
The message of Frontiero is clear:

persons similarly situated, whether male or

female, must be accorded evenhanded treatment by the law.

53. Id. at 291.
54. But cf. Arends v. Arends, 517 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1974).

The Utah Supreme

Court stated that the argument might have some merit in a case where the father was
"equally gifted in lactation as" the mother. Id. at 1020.
55. H.R.J. RES. 208 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1971).

The amendment states,

"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on account of sex." Thirty-three of the required 38 states have ratified the amendment.
56. H.

San Antonio Light, Parade Magazine, Mar. 31, 1974, at 7.

CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 18.2,

at 613 (1968).

In most instances, consent of the putative father is not required in

adoption proceedings. See, e.g., In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Minn. 1965).
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rule is that, practically speaking, the putative father is seldom concerned
about the well-being of the child. 7 The father's consent to the adoption
procedure is frequently eliminated statutorily on the presumption that the
father is unfit simply because he has never married the mother.5 8
These reasons for the nonrecognition of putative fathers' relational interests in their illegitimate offspring have lately been challenged and are coming under increasing judicial attack. In Minnesota, by statute, the consent
of the putative father is not required in an adoption proceeding. 59 In In
re Brennan,60 under the authority of this statute, the father of an illegitimate
child was denied a voice in the adoption of his child and appealed to the
supreme court of that state. The court reasoned that the consent provision
of the adoption statute was drafted with the assumption that the putative
father would evince no interest in the disposition of his illegitimate child and
therefore did not apply in this instance. 1 The court recognized the legal
interest of the father in the illegitimate child and decided that 62he should
therefore be entitled to present his views in an adoption proceeding.
The approach toward recognition of the putative father's rights initiated
in Brennan is considered by some authorities to be a more enlightened view
than the blind application of a statutory presumption which is, in itself, of
doubtful validity.65 When the father has established a relational interest in
the child by acknowledging paternity, contributing to the support of the
child, and displaying a sincere affection for the child, there is no reason why
64
his interest should not be recognized at law.
In its recent decision in Stanley v. Illinois, 65 the Supreme Court recognized the putative father's legally enforceable relational interest in his illegitimate children. In Stanley, the father, though unmarried, had established a relational interest in his family by living with and supporting the
children and their mother. When the mother died, the State of Illinois instigated proceedings to declare the children dependent and neglected and
to have them removed from the father's custody. The proceeding was based
57. H.
at 625
58.
59.
60.
61.

CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATIFS §

18.4,

(1968).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24, subd. 1(a) (1971).
134 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1965).
Id. at 131-32.

62. Id. at 131-32.
63.

E.g., H.

CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 18.4, at 626 (1968); Remarks of Harry M. Fain, Proceedings, A.B.A. SECTION OF
FAMILY LAw 27-9 (Aug. 13, 1963).

64. H.

CLARK, THE LAw OF

DOMESIC

RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §

18.10,

See In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 132 (Minn. 1965). See also
at 668 (1968).
Caruso v. Superior Court, 412 P.2d 463, 467 (Ariz. 1966); Olney v. Gordon, 402

S.W.2d 651, 653 (Ark. 1966); In re Mark T., 154 N.W.2d 27, 39 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967).
65. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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upon the statutory presumption that a putative father is unfit, because unmarried, and therefore does not qualify as a suitable custodian of his children. 6 Under the statutory proceeding, Stanley had no legally recognized
interest in his children and, therefore, no right to notice and hearing of the
suit which would deprive him of their custody. The Court, in reversing the
decision, found that a putative father who had established a relational interest in his children had a "substantial and cognizable interest" in the custody
of those children.67 Given the legal recognition of Stanley's personal interest
in his illegitimate children, his rights could not be terminated without the
notice and hearing required by the due process clause of the 14th amend68
ment. The Illinois statute was declared unconstitutional.
In arriving at its decision in Stanley, the Court cited a series of cases
which emphasize the basic and essential nature of man's right to conceive
and rear children. a Recognition of the putative father's rights arises out
of what the Court referred to as the substantial and cognizable personal interest of a man in the children he has sired and raised, an interest which
may not be negated absent a powerful countervailing state interest. 70
Having established in the father a cognizable personal interest in his illegitimate offspring, logical progression demands the recognition of a similar
prospective interest in his unborn children. In a California case, just such
an interest was given legal protection. 71 The plaintiff brought a cause of
action against the doctor who, with the consent of the plaintiff's wife, had
performed an abortion for her. The wife's consent to the operation barred
a suit for battery, and no wrongful death action was available because the
72
unborn child was not a "minor person" within the meaning of the statute.
The court found the defendant liable for what was, in actuality, a new tort,
by holding that the father had a legally protectable interest in his unborn
child separate from his wife's interest and therefore unaffected by her consent.73 The plaintiff was allowed to recover for what the court termed "a
direct invasion of the plaintiff's personal rights in the prospective relationship
with his unborn child."' 74 Though it cannot be cited as unassailable
66. Id. at 650.
67. Id. at 652.
68. Id. at 658.
69. Id. at 651. The cited cases are: May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953),
holding that the right to raise children is "far more precious ... than property rights."
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), declaring that the rights of marriage
and procreation are "basic civil rights of man." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) in which the right to conceive and raise children is deemed "essential."
70. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
71. Recent Development, 14 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1962), citing Touriel v. Benven-

iste, Civil Doc. No. 766790 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Oct. 20, 1961).
72. Recent Development, 14 STAN. L. REV.901 (1962).
73. Id. at 904.
74. Id. at 901-902.
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legal precedent, the case does stand as the logical culmination of the decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,75 Skinner v. Oklahoma,76 and May v. Anderson, 77 which treat the conception and rearing of children as basic civil rights.
Given the recognition of a protectable relational interest of the putative father in his post partum children, there appears to be no reason why the pros78
pect of that interest should not be recognized and protected.
Where the putative father has acknowledged his paternity, lived with and
supported the natural mother and the fetus, his prospective rights in the unborn child can effectively be protected through the utilization of procedural
due process. When the mother makes the decision to abort, the putative
father's interest in the fetus could be established in a judicial hearing similar
to that provided in the Stanley case. Professor Louisell advocates such a
procedure for the protection of the unborn child's right to life; 79 however,
his argument necessarily involves the seemingly unanswerable question of
the fetus' standing as a person. 80 If we adopt the procedural method employed in Stanley to allow the putative father to propound his own civil
rights in contesting the mother's decision to abort, the interests of all parties
concerned are adequately served: (1) the mother is allowed to exercise her
constitutionally guaranteed option to abort unless the father succeeds in
proving a protectable relational interest in the unborn child; (2) if judgment
is entered for the father, the mother's right to an abortion has not been unconstitutionally infringed upon because the denial of her right has come
about through the exercise of due process of law; and (3) it becomes unnecessary to determine whether or not the unborn child has the benefit of
constitutional protection because the existence of any such right depends
wholly upon the outcome of a judicial analysis of the natural parents' competing interests. If, however, the father fails to assert his rights in the unborn child within a reasonable time after the mother's decision to abort, he
forfeits his right to a hearing under the equitable doctrine of laches and the
mother's decision prevails. 8' This procedure would alleviate the necessity
75. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
76. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
77. 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
78. Under the Stanley decision, however, the interest of the putative father would
go unrecognized unless established by him through acknowledgement of his paternal responsibility, cohabitation and support of the mother and fetus. If the father fails to
allege and establish this relational interest in the unborn child, the mother's unilateral
decision to abort should prevail.
79. Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REv.233, 251 (1969).
80. Louisell's argument is valid only if one accepts the contention that the fetus
is a "person" vested with constitutional rights and privileges from the moment of conception.
81. The practical considerations of holding an immediate judicial hearing to determine the rights of the competing parties would require a timely decision on the part
of the mother and a prompt reply by the father. Theoretically, the doctrine of laches
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of resorting to the irreconcilable religious, legal and scientific arguments to
determine when life begins, a task which the Supreme Court has, to date,
82
skillfully managed to sidestep.
Furthermore, if an illegitimate father has established a relational interest
in his unborn child which would qualify him for due process protection under Stanley, his rights should be substantial enough to warrant protection
of laws equal to that provided the mother in such circumstances under Frontiero v. Richardson.8 3

Employing the adoption analogy, the father should

have an equal voice in the abortion proceeding which would mean that his
consent would be required before an abortion could be performed. The
relational interest of the legitimate father is presumed and his consent is required under the adoption statutes; likewise, his consent should be required
before an abortion may proceed. The results, if the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, should be the same.
The Wrongful Death Analogy

. Recent developments in litigation in the area of wrongful death recoveries
also show a distinct tendency toward establishment of a protectable relational interest of the putative father in his unborn child. Generally all states
have wrongful death statutes which provide recovery for the benefit of those
84
survivors who are either dependent upon or responsible for a decedent.
In recent years the majority of these statutes have been construed to allow
a parent to recover for the wrongful death of a fetus.8 5 Under these statutes, however, viability of the fetus has often been the determining factor
in allowing recovery 6 which generally depends on whether the fetus is a
"person" within the meaning of the statute. 7 Though some courts have refused to permit the action where the fetus had not reached the stage of viability at the time of the injury, the "slight majority have been more concould cut both ways. If the mother fails to make a timely decision to abort and it
becomes impossible for the father to be provided with a hearing prior to the stage of
viability, she could be estopped from obtaining the abortion.
82. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) where the Court states, "[w]e need
not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." Id. at 159.
83. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
84. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971);
S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.11, at 15 (1966).

85. See Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1964); Porter v. Lassiter,
87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky.

1955); Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847, 850 (La. Ct. App.
1951); Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959); Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Wis. 1967). See also Note,
The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 349, 359 (1971); Recent Development, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 729, 737 (1972).
86. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 337 (4th ed. 1971)
and cases cited therein.

87. Id. § 55, at 338.
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cerned with compensation for a distressing wrong in the loss of a child, and
have allowed it." S These decisions seem to fulfill more adequately the purpose behind the enactment of wrongful death statutes. The statutes are designed to provide a recovery for the destruction of the relational interest
which the parent has in the child. The fetus represents an entity which,
if nature is allowed to take its course, will develop into a child. The death
of either the fetus or the post partum child terminates this family relationship, the protection of which is the essence of recovery under the statutes.
When the prospective nature of the parents' interest in the child is analyzed
in this respect, considerations of viability become irrelevant.
Though parents of legitimate children are now allowed to recover in most
jurisdictions for the wrongful death of a non-viable fetus, recovery has traditionally been denied in situations where an illegitimate relationship is concerned.8 9 Three recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have raised serious doubts as to the constitutional validity of these traditional statutory disqualifications. In Levy v. Louisiana ° an illegitimate child was allowed to
recover for the wrongful death of his mother. The Court held that disqualification of illegitimate children under the Louisiana wrongful death statute
which allowed legitimate children to recover was a violation of the illegitimate child's right to equal protection of the laws."' In arriving at this decision, the Court stated:
While a State has broad power when it comes to making classifications, [citation omitted] it may not draw a line which constitutes an
invidious discrimination against a particular class ....
[I]n her
death they suffered wrong in the sense that any de92
pendent would.
On remand, it appears that the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the
decision in Levy to apply as well to a suit by a child to recover for the
wrongful death of his putative father.93 In the 1972 decision of Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,94 this interpretation by the Louisiana Supreme
Court was confirmed. Two illegitimate children were allowed to recover for
88. Id. § 55, at 338.
89. S. SPEISER, RECOvERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 10.4, at 587 (1966). This differentiation in statutes patterned after Lord Campbell's Act arises from the use of the
word "kin" in that statute which has been strictly construed to pertain only to legitimate kin. Therefore, modem statutes which use the words "father," "mother,"
"children," "brother" or "sister" are construed to apply only to legitimate "fathers,"
"mothers," "children," "brothers" or "sisters."

90. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
91. Id. at 72.
92. Id. at 71-72.
93. Levy v. State, 216 So. 2d 818, 820 (La. 1968); Krause, The Bastard Finds His
Father, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 100, 101 (1969).
94. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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the wrongful death of their father on the same equal protection grounds utilized in Levy. 9 5 In consideration of the children's claim, the Court remarked:
Here, as in Levy, -there is impermissible discrimination. An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the loss of a
parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowledged. So far as this record shows, the dependency and natural
affinity of the unacknowledged illegitimate children for their father
were as great as those of 96
the four legitimate children whom Louisiana
law 'has allowed to recover.
Likewise, the mother of an illegitimate child was allowed to recover for the
wrongful death of her child in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.9 7 in which the Court stated:
To say that the test of equal protection should 'be the 'legal' rather
than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal
Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw
such 'legal' lines as it chooses ...
Where the claimant is plainly the mother, the State denies equal protection of the laws to withhold relief merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was born to her out of wedlock. 98
Thus, the illegitimate child may recover for the wrongful death of either
parent on the basis of equal protection as can the mother recover for the
death of her illegitimate child. The question becomes whether the putative
father should be provided with a recovery for the wrongful death of his child
on the same constitutional grounds. Once the putative father has established a cognizable and protectable relational interest in his child, as did the
plaintiff in Stanley v. Illinois,99 these rights should have the benefit of equal
protection of the laws. The putative father who acknowledges his children,
lives with and supports them, has without doubt established a familial relationship very similar to that which a legitimate father has. The primary
difference between the two relationships is merely that which is artificially
imposed by law for lack of a marriage license. Even this defect in the parents' marital relationship has not prevented recovery by the illegitimate child
for the death of either parent or by the mother for her illegitimate child.
Under these circumstances, not only are the putative father and legal father
similarly situated, but so are the putative father and the mother of his children. It seems that the Supreme Court's decisions in Levy, Weber, Glona
and Frontiero demand equal protection for the father under these circumstances and would allow him to recover uder the wrongful death statutes.
95. Id. at 172.

96. Id. at 169.
97. 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968).
98. Id. at 75-76.

99. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 2, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:407

Where both parents are living together as a family unit with their children,
there is no justification under equal protection standards for a statutory preference which benefits only the mother in wrongful death recoveries. As in
a valid marital relationship, both parents have an equally vested and cognizable interest in their relationships with their children. Both of these interests deserve similar legal consideration under the doctrine of equal protection of law. Following the line of reasoning employed in these cases, recovery by the putative father for the death of his child under the wrongful death
statutes appears to be a constitutional necessity. Once the putative father's
cause of action for the death of his post partum child is recognized, that
cause of action should logically be extended to protect his, as well as a
legal father's, prospective interest in an unborn child.
CONCLUSION

The trend of recent decisions in both adoption and wrongful death litigation indicates a distinct tendency toward legal recognition of a protectable
relational interest of the putative father in his unborn children. The abandonment of the viability consideration' 00 in the field of tort law indicates
the recognition of an enforceable interest of the father in his child from the
date of conception. The enforcement of this interest for the benefit of the
father will not substantially curtail the exercise of the mother's abortion
rights simply because in most instances the father, putative or legal, will not
contest the mother's decision. 101 The father's interest, when asserted in opposition to the mother's decision to terminate pregnancy, must be given due
consideration. Due process should require that the putative father at least
be provided with the benefit of a hearing to determine the strength of his
parental right which the mother, through abortion, seeks to terminate.
100. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 338 (4th ed. 1971);
Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 233, 241, 247 (1969); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and
Logical Inconsistencies,46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 349, 358 (1971).
101. As a practical matter, the putative father is seldom interested in asserting any
rights in his illegitimate child in adoption proceedings. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 18.4, at 625 (1968).
In light of this
fact, the mother's decision to abort, in most instances, will probably go uncontested.
It must be assumed that in the large majority of cases the married mother's decision
to terminate pregnancy is the product of a mutual agreement between herself and her
husband. It is highly doubtful that the husband would thereafter dispute the decision
to abort.
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